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Abstract
We report on a two-stage experiment in which i) we rst elicit the
social network within a section of undergraduate students and ii) we then
measure their altruistic attitudes by means of a standard Dictator game.
We observe that more socially integrated subjects are also more altruistic,
as betweenness centrality and reciprocal degree are positively correlated
with the level of giving, even after controlling for framing and social dis-
tance, which have been shown to signicantly a¤ect giving in previous
studies. Our ndings suggest that social distance and social integration
are complementary determinants of altruistic behavior.
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Jel Classification: C93, D85
1 Motivation
The so-called Dictator Game is a classic experimental protocol by which a
subject (the Dictator) takes decisions unilaterally over the division of a xed
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amount of money with another -usually anonymous- subject (the Recipient).
The anonymity of the protocol may suggest that Dictators keep all the money
for themselves. However, this selsh behavior is rarely observed in the lab. In
contrast, about 20% of the money is given to the Recipient under a wide variety
of experimental conditions.1 This evidence is usually interpreted as an instance
of altruistic behavior.
In recent years, a large number of Dictator Game experiments have high-
lighted several factors as determinants of giving. These include two e¤ects which
are of interest for this paper:2
1. framing e¤ects, that is, the way in which the Dictators decision prob-
lem is presented to subjects. One particular instance is the presence of
non-neutral sentences highlighting the Recipients dependency on the
Dictators choice;3
2. social distance e¤ects, that is, the degree of anonymity -induced by the ex-
perimental conditions- of the Dictator-Recipient and Dictator-Experimenter
relationships.4
As we just mentioned, the usage of the term social distance here refers
to the amount of information provided to the Dictator on the identity of the
Recipient and/or the Experimenter. However, in some recent papers, namely
Jones and Rachlin (2006), Leider et al. (2009) and Goeree et al. (2009), the
same concept of social distance indicates, instead, how closesubjects are (e.g.
whether they are friends, friends of friendsand so on) in their own real-
life social network. In this case, social distance is measured by way of some
elicitation protocol in an independent stage of the experiment. In this respect,
all the cited papers show that altruistic behavior is signicantly decreasing in
the social distance between the Dictator and the Recipient.
These ndings provide interesting insights on how social network architecture
inuences giving. However, all these studies look at the Dictator-Recipient
relationship isolated from the complex network layout both subjects (especially
the Dictator) are embedded in. In this respect, the above literature leaves open
the question as to whether altruism is not only related to the Dictator-Recipient
distance, but also to subjectsoverall position (call it social integration) within
the network.5
1See, among others, Ho¤man et al. (1994, 1996), Eckel and Grossman (1996) and Bolton
et al. (1998).
2We also control for gender, since it has been observed that women tend to be more
generous than men (see, for example, Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund,
2001 and Croson and Gneezy, 2009).
3See List (2007) for a survey and Brañas-Garza (2007) for an experimental study.
4See, among others, Ho¤man et al. (1994, 1996), Bohnet and Frey (1999), Burnham (2003),
Brañas-Garza (2006) and Charness and Gneezy (2008).
5Goeree et al. (2009) also consider network e¤ects analogous to ours, as controls. However,
their main focus is on the social distance e¤ect, and its interaction with subjects individual
characteristics (such as height or shyness). In this respect, the inclusion in their regressions
of individual characteristics might shade the social integration e¤ects we analyze here.
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The idea that altruism is related to social integration has been put forward
by the theoretical literature on the coevolution of social networks and prosocial
norms, showing that specic network structures may contribute to the stability
of prosocial behavior (Eshel et al., 1998; Boyd and Richerson, 2002; Marsili et
al., 2004; Nowak, 2006). From a micro perspective, Fosco and Mengel (2008)
set up an evolutionary model by which, in the steady state, prosocial and selsh
individuals coexist, with the latter located at the peripheryof the network.6
The main objective of this paper is precisely to test the conjecture that more
socially integrated individuals exhibit, on average, more altruistic behavior. To
this aim, we relate the altruistic attitudes of an undergraduate section of Eco-
nomics students of the Universidad de Granada to their real-life social-network
position in a two-stage experiment in which i) we rst ask subjects to elicit
the underlying social network of their section and then ii) obtain an indirect
measure of their altruism by means of a standard Dictator Game.
Three di¤erent experimental treatments allow to isolate this social integra-
tion e¤ect to those related to framing and social distance. Even after controlling
for the latter, social integration plays a signicant role in explaining altruism,
both from a local (i.e. at the level of each subjects neighborhood) and a global
(i.e. at the level of the social network as a whole) perspective.
The dependent variables for our statistical exercise are the absolute level
of giving in the Dictator game and a binary index which identies the more
selshsubset of subjects (i.e. those giving nothing, or the minimum amount).
We use three treatment conditions which di¤er across the frameand social
distancedimensions. Our two dependent variables are then regressed - together
with treatment conditions - against some classic measures of integration used
in network theory, such as
1. In-degree: the number of links leading to any given node (in our case the
number of subjects who name subject i as a friend);
2. Out-degree: the number of links starting from any given node (in our
case the number of friends named by subject i);
3. Reciprocal degree: the number of bidirectional links (elicited friendships
which are mutual);
4. Betweenness centrality: the index which measures how centraleach
subject is by counting the number of shortest paths connecting any pair of
nodes in the network which pass through that particular subject. To ob-
tain this index, we need to look at the entire network architecture, instead
of simply considering the local properties of a given node.
6See Figure 1 in Fosco and Mengel (2008), which sketches one of these (simulated) steady-
state equilibria, whose overall structure is remarkably similar to that of Figure 1 in this paper.
Along similar lines, Cassar (2007) reports a signicant e¤ect of the number of neighbors (that
is, a local measure of centrality) on cooperation, in an experiment in which subjects play
simple 2x2 games under di¤erent (exogenously given by the experimental conditions) network
structures.
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These indices measure the embeddedness (or integration) of a subject within
a social network. More precisely, degree measures reect the integration of each
subject within her local neighborhood, while betweenness centrality reects each
subjects integration within the social network as a whole.
Our experimental evidence conrms the above literature showing that frame
and social distance are important determinants of giving behavior. However,
we also show that these variables are never signicant in explaining the proba-
bility of belonging to the selsh sub-group of subjects. By contrast, we observe
that betweenness centrality and reciprocal degree have a signicant impact on
subjectswillingness to give and also on the probability of observing selsh be-
havior. Our results suggest that the e¤ect of individual network position on
giving is complementary to the e¤ect of social distance, previously analyzed in
the literature.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we present the
experimental design, while our experimental results are reported in Section 3.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 4, followed by an Appendix containing
further statistical evidence.
2 Design
2.1 Subjects
The experiment was conducted at the Universidad de Granada. Subjects were
rst-year undergraduate students in Economics belonging to the same section (of
about 100 students in total). Subject recruitment was voluntary, and exclusive
to this section (i.e. nobody else outside the section was invited to participate
to the experiment). The experiment was announced in class and 79 students
agreed to participate.
Since rst-year students from di¤erent sections do not share a single class
hour, and all our subjects had been attending the same set of rst-year courses
for an entire semester, we are condent that our subject pool had been devel-
oping a social network within all section members, as social interaction across
(within) sections is much weaker (stronger). This, in turn, implies we have
clearly dened group bounds, which, together with the high participation, en-
ables us to elicit the underlying social network of the group under scrutiny.
2.2 Stages
The experiment was designed as a 2-stage protocol as follows:
Stage I: network elicitation. The protocol for network elicitation was ex-
tremely simple. We asked the 79 subjects participating to Stage I to write down
the name of their friends from the same section on a piece of paper, since there
is a chance that one of them will later benet in the experiment.
In Stage I no information was provided about the type of decisions subjects
would have to make afterwards, or what the possible benet would be. However,
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since we were interested in subjects revealing the identity of their closefriends,
the instructions clearly stated that they might be given the chance to benet
only one of their friends, randomly selected from their elicited list. Therefore,
the higher number of friends they would list, the lower the chance of beneting
any particular one.7
Given our specic elicitation protocol, we may be capturing the network of
people who would like to benet each other. As a result, we do not capture
links to friends whom our subjects would not like to see beneted, while we
might capture links to people our experimental subjects would like to benet
without being friends. Nevertheless, since beneting each other is an essential
feature of friendship relationships and we explicitly asked for naming friends,
we interpret the elicited graph as the friendship network. In particular, our
elicitation device yields a network of close-friends, since subjects were (made)
aware of the fact that naming many friends would reduce the probability of
favoring any one of them.
In total, our 79 participating subjects named 79 people (all of them belonging
to the same section, with 11 subjects not present/not willing to participate to
the experiment), creating 220 links across our subject pool.8
Stage II: Dictator Game. In Stage II our 79 participants were divided into 3
groups depending on the treatment (see Section 2.3 below). Each group carried
out Stage II simultaneously. For all the treatments, subjects received two 11.5
x 22 cm. (4.5 x 8.8 in.) envelopes in their hand-out package. One envelope
was empty, while the other contained 10 fty-eurocent coins. We asked subjects
to divide this 10-coin endowment between themselves and another subject in
whatever way they wished.9
2.3 Treatments
In Stage II, we had three block-design treatments structured according to the
following two dimensions:
1. Friends/No Friends. Depending on the treatment, subjects knew from
the instructions whether the recipient would be a friend randomly drawn
from their own list (treatment Friends) or someone from their sec-
tion with the exception of the friends they had named (treatment No
Friends).
7This feature of the mechanism was actually explicitly mentioned in the instructions by
stating: Feel free to name as many friends as you wish. However, please remember that the
higher the number of friends you list, the lower the chances are of beneting a specic friend
of yours.
8 In the analysis that follows (see Figure 2 below), we remove those 11 subjects from
the social network, as we focus only on participating students, because we have no infor-
mation about whether these links would have been reciprocated by the non-participating
students, or about the giving decisions of these absent individuals. The whole analysis
has been replicated including the non-present students in network measures and the results
do not change. The analogous to Figure 2, including the removed links, can be found at
http://www.ugr.es/~pbg/material/network.htm.
9The experimental instructions can be found at http://www.ugr.es/~pbg/material/network.htm.
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2. Frame/No Frame. Half of the subjects who faced a no-friend as a
Recipient had an additional sentence framing the Dictator Game which
stated that the Recipient . . .would rely on them....10
Thus, we have the following three treatments: Treatment 1, (No Friend/No
Frame, Baselinehereafter), Treatment 2 (No Friends/Frame, Framehere-
after) and Treatment 3 (Friends/No Frame, Friends hereafter), with 26, 26
and 27 subjects, respectively.11
Every participant in Stage II played as a Dictator and was also a potential
Recipient. In Baseline and Framing treatments the role of Recipients was ran-
domly assigned from the section list, excluding the named friends, while in the
Friends treatment one subject from the list of friends was randomly drawn.
We were extremely careful about preserving anonymity in the Dictator-
Recipient and subject-experimenter relationships, to avoid at best any e¤ect
of the personal (and privately known) features of those relationships we could
not properly control for. For this reason, the experiment was conducted by as-
sistants who had had no previous contact with our subjects and, in contrast with
previous literature, when subjects play with a friend the recipient is randomly
chosen from the list of friends.
On average, subjects earned 4.5 euros (including a show-up fee of 2 euros).
All payments were distributed at the end of Stage II.12
3 Results
3.1 Stage I: elicitation protocol
Figure 1 provides us with a mapping of the directed network (from the subject
naming a friend to the named subject) of our experimental subject pool.
10This particular language has been shown to a¤ect giving (Brañas-Garza, 2007).
11The introduction of the two treatments serves to see whether the e¤ect of network position
still matters even if framing and social distance play a role. Therefore, we did not test the
joint e¤ect of framing and social distance in the experiment.
12Since Recepients have been drawn randomly from the complete section list in case of
Baseline and from the friend list in the Friends treatment, some Recipients were absent at the
time Stage II was run. These subjects were contacted and paid later.
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Fig. 1. Network architecture and contribution proles
On average, subjects named 2.78 friends -including non-participating stu-
dents. This gure is signicantly lower than those of the relevant literature (the
average outdegrees are around 10 and 4.4 for Leider et al. (2009) and Goeree
et al. (2009), respectively).13 On the other hand, the degree of reciprocation
in our data is slightly higher than 50%. This percentage is substantially higher
than those reported in other studies: 36.7% in Leider et al. (2009) and 30% in
the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health hereafter,
Goodreau, 2007).
Higher reciprocity, together with lower average degrees, suggests that our
elicitation mechanism was rather successful in the elicitation of closer relation-
ships. Although we did not distribute any nancial reward in Stage I, we were
extremely clear in the instructions that, in the development of the experiment,
only one of their friendscould possibly be beneted. A completely di¤erent
design strategy was taken, for example, by Leider et al. (2009), by means of an
elicitation protocol which would pay-o¤50 cents for each reciprocated link in the
list, i.e. a mechanism by which subjectsnancial rewards are non-decreasing in
the number of elicited links and strictly increasing in the number of reciprocated
links. Not surprisingly, this also translates into an elicited social network with
a higher number of elicited links and a lower frequency of reciprocated ones.
There are two other salient features of our network architecture. First, most
of the nodes are embedded in a giant component (i.e. they are connected
through some path). Second, the architecture of this component is a combi-
nation of interlinked clusters, either in the form of stars or (almost) complete
13The histograms for indegree and outdegree, as well as reciprocal degree and betweenness,
can be found at http://www.ugr.es/~pbg/material/network.htm.
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graphs. A more detailed analysis shows that our network resembles standard
social network structures, that is, relatively low average distances, and high
clustering compared with a random network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). The
average distance between reachable nodes, that is between the nodes in the gi-
ant component, is 5.4, abstracting from the directionality of links. Since this
number is of the order of logarithm of the size of the network (log(79) ' 4:369),
we can say that in our network average distances are low. The average cluster-
ing coe¢ cient (i.e. the relative frequency of neighbors who are directly linked
themselves) is 0.38 (st.dev. 0.29). In a large randomly generated network with
n nodes and average degree of d, the expected clustering coe¢ cient would be
roughly dn . For a random network with our size and connectivity, we get would
get a clustering coe¢ cient of 0.03, that is, a coe¢ cient of an order of magnitude
lower that the clustering observed in our elicited network. Additionally, we nd
that our network shows positive assortativity: those who are more social tend
to be connected to social individuals. Most of these features have been found
in other empirical social networks.14
3.2 Stage II: Dictator Game
Figure 1 also provides a sketch of our main result: more socially integrated
subjects give more. The black nodes correspond to selsh individuals, i.e.
subjects who give nothing or the smallest possible amount (about 19% of our
subject pool), while the white nodes are subjects who give more than one.
Abstracting from the direction of nodes, note that, in general, the position of
the black nodes in the graph is either peripheral (subjects 6, 20, 24, 46, and 59)
or they are embedded in completely connected clusters (2, 29, 34, 37, 38, 50,
63, and 66). In both cases, the potential removal of these nodes does not have
a large e¤ect on the (inter)connectivity of the remaining nodes, that is, these
nodes are not crucial for the network architecture.15
Figure 2 shows the box plots representing the distribution of Dictators
o¤ers in Stage II (integers from 0 to 6, given that no subject contributed with
more than 6 coins) in the three treatments.16 As Figure 2 shows, the Dictator
keeps, on average, 8 coins for himself and gives 2 to the Recipient in the Baseline
treatment. In this treatment, very few Dictators (11%) share their endowment
equally, while 19% of them behave completely selsh, keeping all the money for
14See Goyal (2007). Using the coe¢ cient of assortativity proposed by Newman (2002),
we nd positive assortativity in our data (r = 0:19 for in-degree and rises to r = 0:50 for
reciprocal degree). Even though positive assortativity is observed in many social networks,
Jackson (2008, Chapter 3.2.4) correctly points out that there are too many exceptions, and
makes a call for a more systematic analysis of this issue.
15Even though the removal of subject 50 would disconnect subject 26, this e¤ect is weak on
the overall connectivity of the network. An exception seems to be subject 12, who creates a
bridge between two components. However, she names three nodes as her friends, but none of
these links is actually reciprocated.
16The boxes show 50% of the total observations (from the 25% to the 75% percentile).
Adjacent lines trace the rst upper and lower adjacent values, while points denote outliers.
The line within the box denotes the median. The broken line connects the means of the three
distributions.
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themselves. These results are in line with analogous experiments and make us
condent that eliciting the network before playing the Dictator game did not
signicantly a¤ect Dictatorsbehavior in Stage II.17
Fig. 2. Distributions of Dictatorsgiving in Stage II
Framing seems to enhance altruistic behavior as the entire distribution of
Treatment 2 shiftsup compared with the Baseline. As a consequence, equal
splitting becomes much more frequent (19% of total observations) in the Fram-
ing treatment. With regard to Treatment 3 (Friends), average o¤ers further
increase, as it does their variability. In this latter case, 37% of subjects give (at
least) half of the endowment. Standard t-tests show that giving is signicantly
greater in the Friends and Framing treatments, compared with the Baseline
(t =  2:524, p = :007 and t =  2:437, p = :009, respectively; one-tailed tests).
Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests also indicate that the distribution are not
equal (z =  2:486, p = :013 and z =  2:434, p = :015, respectively).
By contrast, the di¤erence in giving between the Framing and Friends treat-
ments is not statistically signicant (t =  0:222, p = :825 for two-tailed t-test
and z =  :705, p = :4807 for Mann-Whitney test). From Figure 2 we can
see that average giving is virtually the same in both treatments; the only real
di¤erence is their variability.
Goeree et al. (2009) report 36% greater giving to rst-order neighbors with
respect to more distant individuals, while Leider et al. (2009) observe an in-
crease of 52% in giving to rst-order neighbors, rather than strangers. In our
data, Dictators give 49% more to their friends with respect to any random sub-
ject at a social distance larger than one, that is, an increase which lies in between
the values we just reported. In this respect, our network elicitation mechanism
17See, mong others, Ho¤man et al. (1996) and Eckel and Grossman (1996).
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does not seem to induce any specic behavioral bias in the Dictatorsdecisions,
compared with the related literature.
Clearly, the analysis of Figure 2 does not properly account for treatment
conditions. In Table 1 we perform a regression analysis including gender, treat-
ment and network regressors. Network centrality is captured through binary
indices which take value 1 if the corresponding subject is characterized by a
level above the median of the corresponding centrality measure (in-degree, out-
degree, reciprocal degree and betweenness) and 0 otherwise.18
We run two sets of regressions. In regressions [1a] to [4a] we use altruism
as a dependent variable, whereas regressions [1b] to [4b] analyze selshness.
Each of the four models considers one network measure (in-degree, out-degree,
reciprocal degree and betweenness). More precisely,
[1a] to [4a]. The probability of any possible level of giving (an integer from 0 to 6) is
estimated by an ordered logit regression using network measures, female
and treatment dummies (Friends and Framing) as explanatory variables.
[1b] to [4b]. The probability of belonging to the sub-group of selsh" subjects is es-
timated by a logit regression using network measures, a constant, female
and treatment dummies as explanatory variables.
Tab. 1. Regressions for Giving and Selshness
Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh
[1a] [1b] [2a] [2b] [3a] [3b] [4a] [4b]
In-degree .228 -1.179* - - - - - -
(.424) (.695) - - - - - -
Out-degree - - -.361 -.240 - - - -
- - (.478) (.765) - - - -
Rec. degr. - - - - 1.001** -1.750** - -
- - - - (.454) (.805) - -
Between. - - - - - - 1.037** -1.790***
- - - - - - (.473) (.712)
Female .959** -1.035 1.123** -1.271** .678 -.963 .666 -.875
(.451) (.630) (.464) (.646) (.463) (.641) (.466) (.653)
Friends 1.788*** -.835 1.649*** -.600 2.028*** -1.226 1.900*** -1.018
(.546) (.730) (.559) (.729) (.556) (.786) (.550) (.765)
Fram. 1.409*** -1.385* 1.278** -1.150 1.620*** -1.718** 1.480*** -1.483*
(.513) (.814) (.515) (.806) (.522) (.868) (.511) (.851)
Cons. - .281 - -.198 - .594 - .644
(.641) (.606) (.701) (.690)
Standard errors are in parentheses. N=79,(P>{2)<.05.
***, **, and * indicate signicance at p = .01, .05, and .1, respectively.
18We use dummies to better capture non-linearities in the underlying relations. Analogous
results can be obtained using the indexes and the indexes squared.
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In Table 1, the coe¢ cients in regressions [1a] to [4a] measure the average
increase in the log-odds of giving more for subjects with network measures
above the median, while in regressions [1b] to [4b] they measure the percentage
increase in the odds of belonging to the selshsubgroup.
We begin by noticing that our treatment variables (Friends and Framing)
have a large and signicant impact on equations [1a] to [4a], while they are
(almost) never signicant at 5% condence in regressions [1b] to [4b]. In other
words, our treatment variables a¤ect the level of giving, but they have no e¤ect
on the probability with which any given subject belongs to the group of the
most selsh individuals. Remember that our treatment variable Friends prox-
ies social distance, in the sense that, when Friends= 1; the Dictator shares his
endowment with a subject at distance one from him, whereas the distance
between the Dictator and the Recipient is larger when Friends= 0: In this re-
spect, our estimates conrm previous results in the literature: people are more
altruistic toward socially closer individuals. Similar considerations apply for the
framing e¤ect.
In the regressions, out-degree and in-degree are never signicant at 5%. By
contrast, betweenness centrality and reciprocal degree coe¢ cients are always
signicant. The positive signs of the coe¢ cients in regressions [3a] and [4a] show
that these measures of integration have a positive e¤ect on the level of giving,
while the negative sign of the coe¢ cients of these variables in regressions [3b]
and [4b] indicates that a subject with a high reciprocal degree or betweenness
is less likely to be selsh. The odds of giving more are e1:037 = 2:83 times
greater for individuals whose betweenness is above the median, while they are
2:72 larger for agents whose reciprocal degree is above the median, holding other
variables constant. Concerning the likelihood of belonging to the group of most
selsh individuals, above-median individuals in betweenness or reciprocal degree
are roughly 83% less likely to give nothing or the smallest possible amount.
To interpret these results, remember that betweenness is a globalmeasure
of a subjects social integration, while the degree measures concern integration
at a local level. In-degree and out-degree reect local integration, either as it is
perceived by others (the number of subjects who consider i as a friend), or by
the subject herself (the number of subjects that i considers as friends). Finally,
reciprocal degree encompasses both these aspects, as it requires consistency
between is perceptions and those of her elicited friends, given the additional
requirement of reciprocity.19 In this respect, our results indicate that only
strongmeasures of social integration matter for altruism, both at the local
(reciprocal degree) and the global (betweenness centrality) level.
Given the complementary role of social distance and centrality in giving
behavior, we check whether this social integration e¤ect interacts with that of
social distance. Table 2 (in the Appendix) shows that this is not the case in
any of regressions from Table 1, as the dummy for the interaction between the
corresponding measure of centrality and Friends is never signicant. We also
19Reciprocity is actually one of the requirements listed by Granovetter (1973) to distinguish
between weakand strong ties.
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run the same regressions as in Table 1 excluding the observations from the
Friends treatment. As Table 3 (in the Appendix) reports, our ndings are not
driven by the Friends treatment, and still hold even when subjects deal only
with non-friends.
It is worth noting that the elicited network represents a network of indi-
viduals within a given frame (i.e. university social ties). Naturally, individuals
have social ties outside our frame, which we do not observe (family, work, sports
practice etc.). Peripheral individuals in the network analyzed here may be more
central in di¤erent networks. An interesting issue for further research is how
individual centrality and behavior relates across di¤erent networks.
4 Discussion
This paper explores the relationship between social integration and altruistic
behavior. Our results show that social network architecture matters for altru-
ism at both the local and the global level. We control for other signicant
factors already highlighted by the literature such as gender, framing or social
distance. Even after controlling for these variables, social integration remains
an important factor for giving and selsh behavior.
Our statistical exercise in Table 1 would seem to suggest a causal relationship
between network centrality and altruism, since network variables are in the
list of regressors.20 This estimation strategy follows the empirical literature on
network/peer e¤ects in which network architecture is a primitive of the economic
environment. Nevertheless, the authors of this literature are well aware of the
fact that subjectsindividual characteristics may also inuence their position in
the network, making it di¢ cult to disentangle the pure network e¤ect from
individual heterogeneity (Durlauf, 2008).
In the context of our data set, the same dilemma can be posed as follows:
are subjects (on average) more altruistic because they are pivotal in their social
network, or are they pivotal because they show (for whatever reason) a more
altruistic attitude toward the rest of the group? Concerning this point, it is
worth mentioning the vast experimental evidence on the persistence of sharing
rules across life stages. This literature reports that there is a certain evolution
of the norm adherence during childhood, but once early adulthood is reached,
the norm adherence seems to remain constant (Benenson et al. 2007; Krause
and Harbaugh, 2000; Sutter and Kocher; 2007). Since our experimental subjects
are university undergraduates, it is reasonable to assume that these prosocial
processes are already well established for our subject pool, thus contributing to
the dynamics of friendship network formation. For this reason, it may well be
the case that an individual altruistic attitude may favor greater integration in
the social network.
In our experimental protocol, even though the decision of giving was made
after the network elicitation and the social network of Figure 1 was already well
20This is also the same estimation strategy followed in all the relevant literature cited in
this paper.
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established at the time subjects had to make their contribution decision,21 it
is clear that both the social abilities and the social norms of the subjects as
well as personality traits were determined long before the experiment.22 Our
interpretation of the results is that given the social abilities and norms of the
individuals, they formed a social network in their class and in that social network
we measured their willingness to share a given endowment. Our analysis allows
us to state that their behavior in sharing the endowment (i.e. their generosity)
with other members of the network is related to their position in that network,
even though it is not possible to denitely establish causality.
A very similar problem is faced by Calvó-Armengol et al. (2005), who es-
timate peer group e¤ects in education patterns of a sample of US adolescents.
The richness of the Add Health database allows them to mitigate this endogene-
ity problem by controlling for proxies of leadershipand self-esteemwhich
are correlated with the variable of interest, but also can a¤ect subjectsposi-
tion in their social network. Our data does not allow us to replicate such an
estimation strategy. However, experimental methods could allow us to control
network dynamics and their coevolution with subjectsbehavioral traits in more
detail. The analysis of this question is left for future research.
21Note also that Stage 1 decisions contribute to the matching protocol of Stage 2 (and in
this sense, network elicitation a¤ects giving decisions, albeit indirectly).
22A recent paper by Fowler et al. (2009) indeed suggests that network position may be
partially genetically determined.
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5 Appendix
Table 2: Regressions for Giving and Selfish. with Interactions
Indegree centr. Out-Degree centr. Rec. Degree centr. Betweenness centr.
Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh
[5a] [5b] [6a] [6b] [7a] [7b] [8a] [8b]
Centrality .241 -1.353 -.743 -.240 1.109** -1.750** 1.086** -1.790***
(.456) .892 (.485) (.765) (.484) (.805) (.449) (.712)
Centr.  Friends .227 .321 1.473 (a) -.071 (a) -.149 (a)
(978) (1.493) (1.138) (.930) (1.088)
Female .775 -.984 .959** -1.271** .505 -.963 .639 -.875
(.486) (.618) (.481) (.646) (.520) (.641) (.486) (.653)
Friends 1.500* -.884 1.081 -.600 1.912** -1.226 1.716* -1.018
(857) (.872) (.718) (.729) (.810) (.786) (1.038) (.765)
Fram. 1.246*** -1.367 1.026** -1.150 1.489*** -1.718** 1.432*** -1.483*
(.497) (.887) (.508) (.806) (.482) (.868) (.494) (.851)
Cons. - 1.259 - -.198 - .594 - .644
(1.036) (.606) (.701) (.690)
(a) variable dropped. Standard errors are in parentheses. N=79, (P>{2)<.1.
***, **, and * indicate signicance at p = .01, .05, and .10, respectively.
Table 3: Regressions for Non-Friends Treatments
Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh
[9a] [9b] [10a] [10b] [11a] [11b] [12a] [12b]
In-degree .289 -1.347 - - - - - -
(.516) (.904)
Out-degree - - -.814 .497 - - - -
(.546) (.957)
Rec. degr. - - - - 1.351** -1.566 - -
(.578) (.988)
Between. - - - - - - 1.271** -1.914**
- - - - - - (.514) (.886)
Female .646 -1.068 .952 -1.391 .264 -1.018 .478 -1.048
(.641) (-779) (.614) (.869) (.702) (.776) (.634) (.805)
Fram. 1.415** -1.369 1.187** -.932 1.733*** -1.598* 1.646*** -1.509*
(.595) (.893) (.599) (.864) (.585) (.978) (.603) (.817)
Cons. - 1.383 - .924 - 1.493 - 1.530
(1.215) (1.181) (1.203) (1.349)
Standard errors are in parentheses. N=52,(P>{2)<.1
***, **, and * indicate signicance at p = 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively.
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Table 4: Regressions for Giving and Selshness
over Clustering and Eigenvector Centrality
Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh
[13a] [13b] [14a] [14b]
Clustering -.200 .428 - -
(.442) (.650) - -
Eigenvector centrality - - .165 -.548
- - (.442) (.633)
Female .916* -1.322** .792 -.999*
(.494) (.645) (.508) (.605)
Friends 1.542** -.457 1.578*** -.616
(.628) (.696) (.602) (.648)
Fram. 1.158** -1.008 1.231** -1.210
(.498) (.783) (.483) .826
Cons. - .805 - .866
(1.008) (1.000)
Standard errors are in parentheses. N=79,(P>{2)>.05.
***, **, and * indicate signicance at p = .01, .05 and .1, resp.
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